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CARGO OF FIRE: A CALL FOR STRICTER
REGULATION OF LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS
SHIPMENT AND STORAGE
Philip Weinberg*
I. Introduction
The imminent prospect of importation of large quantities of lique-
fied natural gas (LNG) through congested harbors and its storage
in huge tanks in densely-populated urban areas provides a classic
instance of our technological reach exceeding our grasp. The severe
danger of widespread fire impels an exhaustive examination of the
need to import LNG through busy harbors and to store it within
cities. Such conveyance and storage expose millions of persons and
millions of dollars of property to extraordinary harm. Three aspects
of proposed importation of LNG are particularly disturbing: (1) the
federal government's insistence on promoting LNG importation
prior to an adequate investigation of alternatives to such importa-
tion; (2) the risks posed by marine shipment of LNG under current
inadequate government supervision; and (3) the gas industry's pen-
chant for constructing LNG storage tanks in densely-populated
urban areas.
History, although silent on maritime tragedies involving LNG
tankers, provides two examples of the severe consequences which
storage of LNG presents. In 1944, an LNG storage tank in Cleveland
ruptured and the resulting fire and explosion caused 133 deaths and
the devastation of adjacent residential and industrial sections of the
city.' Due to this catastrophe, ordinary steel is no longer used in
LNG tank walls, and diking is constructed around such tanks as an
added precaution.2
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1. SPECIAL AND CHEMICAL HAZARDS COMM. OF THE AM. INS. ASS'N, Cryogenic Natural Gas,
SPECIAL HAZARDS BULL., Dec., 1972, at 1 [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL HAZARDS BULL.].
2. See Napier, Natural Gas and the Environment-Before Combustion in OUTLOOK FOR
NATURAL GAs-A QUALITY FUEL 199, 206-07 (P. Hepple, ed. 1973). See also DISTRIGAS CORP.,
DISTRIGAS OF N.Y. CORP. & DISTRIGAS PIPELINE CORP., COMMENTS TO THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENT
STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE BUREAU OF NATURAL GAS, FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION IN EASCOGAS
LNG INC. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, EPA No. CP 73-47, vol. 2, app. D, at 2-3
[hereinafter cited as IMPACT STATEMENT].
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The second incident occurred on Staten Island, New York in 1973
when an empty LNG tank exploded and caught fire apparently
because the insulation material used had absorbed methane.3 Forty
workers died as a result of this disaster.'
Despite the severity of these two calamities, neither incident re-
sulted in the most serious consequences which could stem from an
accident involving an LNG tank.
This Article will consider the consequential risks of embarking
upon a program of marine importation and urban storage of LNG.
It will also examine the inherent volatility of LNG, the technological
deficiencies of present modes of transoceanic shipping and above-
ground storing of LNG, and the lack of a viable, coordinated federal
and state policy with respect to such shipping and storing.
A. LNG Importation: Is this Trip Necessary?
Before considering the need for governmental intervention, it is
necessary to examine the inherent hazards in shipping LNG and the
probability of any resultant perils from such transportation. The
highly "inflammatory" nature of LNG is the keystone of a discus-
sion of its hazards. To be liquefied, natural gas must be reduced to
a temperature -2580 F and kept at that temperature.' If the tempera-
ture rises above that point, natural gas boils, and its molecules
rapidly expand in a fashion similar to that which occurs when water
becomes steam. Unlike water, however, LNG is highly flammable.
It consists mostly of methane, with small amounts of ethane, bu-
tane, nitrogen, and other components.' When LNG boils, the water
vapor present in the air will condense and cause a cloud of gas to
be formed.' Since the cold gas vapor from LNG is 1.5 times heavier
than air, it tends to travel along the ground while mixing with air.'
3. For a discussion of this disaster and subsequent settlements of certain suits arising
therefrom, see N.Y. Times, March 25, 1976, at 25, col. 5. See also Bus. WEEK, March 29, 1976,
at 40.
4. Bus. WEEK, March 29, 1976, at 40, col. 2.
5. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, NATURAL GAS SHORTAGE: THE ROLE OF IMPORTED LIQUEFIED NAT-
URAL GAS 24 (1975) [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER GENERAL REP.].
6. SPECIAL HAZARDS BULL. 2-3.
7. Id. at 31.
8. Id.
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An LNG cloud will rise when its density falls below that of the
surrounding air.9 LNG spilled on water or land will vaporize rapidly
and a flammable mixture of LNG and air will spread downwind and
then retreat.'0 A mixture of vaporized LNG and air will ignite upon
contact with any open flame" and the resulting fire will almost
inevitably spread rapidly through the entire LNG cloud, ending
only when the level of gas dispersion renders flame transmission
impossible."
A fire resulting from any contact of an LNG cloud with open
flame would be of enormously high intensity. Assuming a five mile
per hour wind, a leak caused by the failure of a 400' x 400' above-
ground LNG tank would result in a vapor cloud traveling a mile in
twelve minutes; and, in the event of ignition, any person within 900
feet would suffer skin blistering after 30 seconds." Wood, paper,
plastic, grass, or any other combustible material would ignite within
500 feet.
Fortunately, we have not as yet had experience with a collision
involving an LNG vessel.'" In the only comparable incident, the
Yuyo Maru, with a cargo of liquefied propane gas and naphtha,
collided with another ship off Tokyo in 1974, causing a severe fire.'"
The ship was towed several miles offshore and sunk by gunfire.'7
The risk of widespread fire from a collision involving LNG is real.
Reasonable estimates of the result of such a maritime or ship-to-
shore collision are that its impact might rupture the skin of even a
double-hulled tanker or barge containing LNG, releasing a rapidly
vaporizing cloud which, upon the slightest exposure to open flame,
would transform the vessel into a drifting holocaust.
These traits of LNG make it dangerous in ways akin to explosives,
nuclear materials, and other substances universally recognized as
hazardous. It is, therefore, reasonable to ask why it should be
9. Id.
10. See id. at 31-32.
11. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REP. 31.
12. SPECIAL HAZARDS BULL. 32.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REP. 31.
16. MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY OF THE JAPANESE Gov'T, REP. ON THE OUTLINE OF COLLISION
BETWEEN JAPANESE TANKER Yuyo Maru No. 10 AND LIBERIAN FREIGHTER Pacific Ares 1,4 (1975).
17. Id. at 3, 22-23.
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shipped into congested harbors, such as New York's, or stored in
tanks in heavily populated areas. This author is convinced that it
should not be. In the first place, the supposed need for the LNG
importation program deserves skeptical scrutiny-not only because
of the admitted dangers inherent in transporting this ultrahazar-
dous substance but also because of the extraordinary costs of its
shipment and storage. Moreover, in contrast to other proposals to
alleviate our energy shortage, LNG importation tends to perpetuate
our dependence on sources in Algeria and other mideastern coun-
tries-the very dependence which led to sharp price increases in
1973 and the resulting oil shortage. If that crisis taught one lesson,
it is that reliance on imported fuels is very risky. To promote de-
pendence on an imported fuel which increases the risk of catasrophe
in shipment and storage is to incur additional dangers without alle-
viating the original threat.
B. Natural Gas Regulation and Supply
The claimed need to import LNG stems from the recent shortage
of natural gas.'" This, in turn, has led to refusals by utilities to
supply new commercial and industrial customers and to contin-
gency plans calling for cut-offs to non-residential customers who
have alternate sources of heat available."9 It has been contended
that prices set by the Federal Power Commission (FPC) are
artificially low, and that the solution lies in deregulation, which
would provide greater incentive to drill and to seek new sources of
gas. 0 This solution might be a cure worse than the disease, however,
since deregulation might raise the price of gas precipitously to cus-
tomers already beset with increasing oil and gasoline costs. None-
theless, such price rises would have one virtue since they would
probably reduce unnecessary use of the fuel and act as a spur to
conservation.
18. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GENERAL REP. 11-22.
19. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Restrictions on Attachment of New Gas Customers, Cas.
No. 25-766, at 26-27 (Oct. 19, 1971).
20. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL REP. 19-21, 23; Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas
Shortages and the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers, 86 HARV. L. REv. 941 (1973); Roddis,
What Is the Inferior Use of Gas?, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 14, 1971, at 90; Note, Natural Gas
and the Federal Power Commission, 47 IND. L.J. 725 (1972). Contra, Douglas, The Case for
the Consumer of Natural Gas, 44 GEO. L.J. 566 (1956).
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In order to weigh whether deregulation makes sense, it is neces-
sary to examine the development of natural gas supplies. Surpris-
ingly, gas was never actually sought by fuel explorers until quite
recently. It was almost always a by-product of oil companies' search
for oil, since it was frequently found in the same fields and it is a
geologically older form of the same chemically transformed plant
life as oil. Gas was at first sold almost wholly intrastate, and regu-
lated purely on a local basis by public utility commissions, like
telephone service and electricity. Intrastate sales of gas in New York
are still regulated in the same manner." As interstate sales of gas
increased, the cost of transporting such gas by pipeline "became a
significant . . . factor in determining consumer rates."" Therefore,
in order to control prices effectively, states had to confront the issue
of whether the regulation of interstate pipeline companies was pro-
hibited under the commerce clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. The Supreme Court found "that the transportation of gas
through pipe lines from one State to another is interstate com-
merce," and that such interstate commerce did not cease until the
gas was in the transmission lines of the local, intrastate distribu-
tor. " Pressure mounted for federal legislation which would control
21. See N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAW § 65 (McKinney 1955). This law authorizes New York's
Public Service Commission to regulate gas prices to consumers and to forbid unreasonable
discrimination and preferences.
22. Bagge & Hynan, Liquefied Natural Gas Imports and the United States Energy Crisis:
A Regulatory Response, 4 LAW & POLIcY IN INT'L Bus. 37, 41 (1972).
23. Public Util. Comm'n v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236, 245 (1919). In Landon, the Court held
that a state could regulate the price of gas charged by independent local distributors despite
an agreement between such distributors and an interstate pipeline company which had fixed
the pipeline's compensation as a percentage of the distributor's gross profits.
In Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252 U.S. 23 (1920), the Court dis-
tinguished Landon and permitted state regulation where gas companies in Pennsylvania
supplied gas directly to consumers in Jamestown, New York. The Court allowed New York
to regulate gas prices to the Jamestown consumers on the basis that the object of New York's
regulation was "local" in character due to the direct pipeline between the Pennsylvania
suppliers and the New York consumers. Id. at 28-29.
In two subsequent cases, however, the Court indicated that Pennsylvania Gas was to be
construed narrowly. In Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 265 U.S. 298, 308 (1924), the
Court again considered state regulation of an interstate pipeline company which sold gas
to local distributors. It distinguished Pennsylvania Gas on the ground that the Pennsylvania
Gas Co. had been engaged in a purely local activity, retail sales of gas, while the case at bar
and Landon involved wholesale sales of gas. Id. at 308-09. The Court in Kansas Natural Gas
opined:
The contention that, in the public interest, the business is one requiring regulation,
need not be challenged. But Congress thus far has not seen fit to regulate it, and its
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effectively the interstate pipeline companies. 4 Congress' response
was the Natural Gas Act.2"
The Natural Gas Act expanded the jurisdiction of the FPC from
hydroelectric plants 6 to include sales in interstate commerce of nat-
ural gas for resale. However, this jurisdiction did not apply to the
production of gas. 7 Throughout this period the liquefaction of gas
was unknown and it was accepted as axiomatic that "[t]here is
only one known method of transporting natural gas in commercial
quantities and that is by pipe line under pressure." 8 Technology has
made that statement as anachronistic as an interurban trolley
schedule. But the regulatory authority of the FPC and our other
energy and environmental agencies has not kept pace with these
scientific advances.
From the start, the FPC was criticized by gas producers seeking
total deregulation of gas prices and by consumer spokesmen urging
stricter regulation.29 Although the courts recognized the purpose of
the Natural Gas Act to be the protection of consumers from exces-
silence, where it has the sole power to speak, is equivalent to a declaration that
particular commerce shall be free from regulation.
Id. at 308.
Similarly, in Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co. 273 U.S. 83 (1927), the
Court decided that Kansas Natural Gas and not Pennsylvania Gas was the controlling pre-
cedent in a case involving the wholesale sale of electricity from a company in one state to a
company in another state. Id. at 87-89. On the basis of this decision and Kansas Natural Gas
it was apparent that interstate pipeline companies selling gas to local, intrastate distributors
were free from any form of governmental price regulation.
24. Bagge & Hynan, supra note 22, at 41.
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1970). In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672
(1954), the Court noted:
There can be no dispute that the overriding congressional purpose [of the Natural Gas
Act] was to plug the "gap" in regulation of natural-gas companies resulting from
judicial decisions prohibiting, on federal constitutional grounds, state regulation of
many of the interstate commerce aspects of the natural-gas business.
Id. at 682-83 (footnote omitted).
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1970).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1970) provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to . . .the sale in interstate commerce of natural
gas for resale ...but shall not apply to . . .the production or gathering of natural gas.
28. FTC, 1936 GAS. REP. quoted in Dungan, Jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission
over Importation of Liquefied Natural Gas, 4 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 276, 277 (1971).
29. See sources cited in note 20 supra.
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sive charges," ' FPC regulation has failed to prevent the vices of an
uncompetitive market shared by a small number of huge produ-
cers.' Yet the pressure from the industry has been unrelenting to
deregulate natural gas at the wellhead. Although both Presidents
Truman" and Eisenhower33 vetoed legislation aimed at achieving
that result, the drumbeat in favor of deregulation has resumed in
recent years.
The inequality in bargaining power between gas producers and
consumers needs no underscoring here. Nearly every consumer of
gas, from the consumer with a gas stove to an electric utility with
gas-fired generators, has a substantial investment in gas-burning
equipment. This investment renders every consumer of gas a cap-
tive user, at least to some extent. Moreover, gas pipeline companies
and public utilities are by their very nature incapable of competing
geographically, and thus they must simply thrust their costs on to
the ultimate consumer with little incentive to bargain with produ-
cers.
34
Proponents of deregulation argue that price controls have failed
to prevent monopolization and have in fact reduced production by
eliminating incentives." One commentator favoring deregulation
argued recently that 36
[the present] shortage is a direct result of FPC regulation of producers'
prices and . . . the shortage has been disproportionately borne by home
consumers .... [Tihe losses arising from the shortage have been so great
that they cannot rationally be worth the pursuit of whatever valid purposes
might be served by lower user prices.
In an effort to resolve this paradox, the FPC has differentiated
between "new" and "old" gas. In the past decade, it has permitted
higher prices for newly-produced gas, while setting area ceilings
30. See, e.g., Atlantic Refining Co. v. Publ. Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954).
31. These huge producers are principally oil companies which began to market natural
gas only after accidentally discovering it in the course of oil exploration. While 5500 compa-
nies produced gas for resale in interstate commerce in 1954, 70% of the total amount was
produced by 35 of these companies. Douglas, supra note 20, at 579-80.
32. Id. at 571-72.
33. Id. at 566.
34. These points are trenchantly discussed in id. at 580-87.
35. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REP. 23.
36. Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 20, at 943.
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when price ceilings for individual companies proved unwieldy.37
While these controls kept gas prices somewhat lower for consum-
ers, the use of gas by industry increased as gas prices became
cheaper than oil. Some commentators have argued that this con-
tributed to the present shortage by fostering a demand for gas by
industries which outbid the interstate pipelines supplying commer-
cial and residential consumers.38 Certainly a shortage of domestic
natural gas now exists,39 requiring utilities to discourage new users
and to insist that large commercial gas-heat users develop plans to
switch to oil in case of interruptions in service. This shortage has
led companies to allocate gas use to insure a continuous supply for
homes, schools, and hospitals, sometimes at the expense of in-
dustrial users.4"
As with many of our energy problems, conservation could have
helped to avoid this impasse.4 For decades thoughtful students of
energy management have been aware that the lack of a comprehen-
sive conservation oriented policy was causing us to drift toward
the rocks. Yet the FPC adamantly refused to consider conservation
or even to distinguish, until recently, between inferior uses of gas,
where substitutes are readily available, and superior uses where
they are not. As long ago as 1944 the prescient Justice Jackson,
concurring in FPC c. Hope Natural Gas Co.,42 warned that "the
wealth of Midas and the wit of man cannot produce or reproduce a
natural gas field." 3
37. These practices were upheld in the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747
(1968).
38. Breyer & McAvoy, supra note 20, at 979.
39. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REP. 21-23.
40. This practice was upheld in FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621
(1972). Tbe Court sustained the FPC's approval of such an allocation plan insuring supplies
of Louisiana gas to out-of-state residential users as against a challenge by a local company.
It noted that state regulation of supplies of interstate gas is impracticable and that FPC
control is necessary to avoid conflicts between gas-producing and consuming states. Id. at
640-41. For a thoughtful discussion of this case and its rationale, see 61 GEO. L.J. 833 (1973)
pointing out that unless the shortage is alleviated, producing states will insist "that the FPC
consider the impact of curtailments on their economies." Id. at 842. Such insistence works
against the interests of consumers in gas-importing regions like the Northeast.
41. As early as 1927, prior to the passage of the Natural Gas Act, the Federal Trade
Commission warned: "Conservation is the first problem that demands attention." FTC,
UTILITY CORPORATIONS, S. REP. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 84-A, at 608 (1927) (Submit-
ted to Congress Dec. 31, 1935), quoted in Stowe, Conservation and The Commission: The
Growth of Regulation of the End Use of Natural Gas by the Federal Power Commission, 3
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 527, 530 (1974).
42. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
43. Id. at 629 (Jackson, J., concurring). Notwithstanding this early recognition of the need
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Despite early Supreme Court recognition of the need to conserve
gas,44 the gas producers' indifference to conservation mirrored that
of the FPC. Only since 1973, when the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo dramatized the reckless-
ness of our lack of an energy policy to even the most obtuse, have
gas producers and the federal government become cognizant of con-
servation. Such "cognizance" was usually manifested as a mere
hurriedly paid obeisance to conservation in preface to a plea for
deregulation of prices at the wellhead.
The Federal Energy Administration estimates that price deregu-
lation would not result in substantial increases in gas production
until 1980.11 Until that time, LNG importation, together with off-
shore exploration for gas and oil, are being touted as solutions to our
shortage, while serious conservation measures still remain untried.
Although a full discussion of proposed offshore oil and gas devel-
opment is beyond the scope of this Article, it is evident that offshore
oil and gas exploration must be conducted under stringent safe-
guards. It is an extremely hazardous venture, risking lasting dam-
age to substantial parts of this country's shell fishing beds, commer-
cial and recreational fishing industries, beaches, harbors, and
coastal wetlands through spills, industrialization, and the building
of ephemeral boom-towns. This is a steep price to pay for a short-
lived resource.
Until serious public commitment is made to revitalize rail trans-
portation for both passengers and freight and to improve building
insulation standards, federal and state governments cannot say that
they have addressed themselves to large-scale energy conservation.
Moreover, until such action has been taken, pressure to pursue
short-sighted policies of importation and offshore exploration for oil
and gas, with their consequential risks to environment and public
health and safety, will undoubtedly continue.
In addition to energy conservation, the federal government is
only now developing sensible alternatives to our country's
for natural resource conservation, government failed to respond quickly in a positive fashion.
One commentator noted, in 1956, that the FPC "has thus far failed to discharge this responsi-
bility [to conserve] in a forceful and consistent manner." McGrath, Federal Regulation of
Producers in Relation to Conservation of Natural Gas, 44 GEO. L.J. 676, 693 (1956).
44. 320 U.S. at 613. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 613 (1944).
45. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REP. 3.
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overdependence on gas and oil. Since a substantial portion of the
gas consumed in this country is used for the generation of electricity
and for space heating, the existence of alternative fuels must be
considered" and weighed against the economic and environmental
costs of LNG importation and deregulation. Such alternatives in-
clude coal and solar energy."
The construction of giant cryogenic tankers and storage facilities
for LNG, in light of their immense costs -of construction and
consequential risks, raises serious questions which should be consid-
ered. Moreover, since consumers must ultimately bear these costs
while being potential victims of any mishaps, they deserve the right
to decide if these costs should be incurred.
II. LNG Import Proposals: The New York City Problem
LNG is currently being brought into Everett, Massachusetts;
Cove Point, Maryland; and Savannah, Georgia. Plans are afoot to
construct storage tanks and ship it into locations near several other
American coastal cities. In 1972 two importers, Distrigas and Easco-
gas, announced plans to ship LNG from Algeria to terminals on
Staten Island, New York; Everett, Massachusetts; and Providence,
46. For a discussion of alternative energy sources, see id. at 36-37. Congress has recognized
the need to
require effective action to develop, and increase the efficiency and reliability of use of,
all energy sources to meet the needs of present and future generations, to increase the
productivity of the national economy and strengthen its position in regard to interna-
tional trade, to make the Nation self-sufficient in energy, to advance the goals of
restoring, protecting, and enhancing environmental quality, and to assure public
health and safety.
42 U.S.C. § 5801(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
47. Although the use of coal poses its own substantial environmental problems stemming
from the effects of strip-mining, coal is plentiful and need not be imported. It is easily and
cheaply transported by rail or barge, and it can be used to generate electricity in areas which
do not have seriously degraded air quality at considerable cost savings and without causing
serious adverse effects on either the environment or the public health. The problems engen-
dered by strip-mining, however, are real, but they can be solved by vigorously enforced
legislation.
Continued research and development of solar heat, solar generation of power, and the
harnessing of tides and geothermal sources of energy hold the promise of future alternatives
to fossil fuels. Congress has appropriated $40 million dollars to the Energy Research and
Development Administration for these salutary purposes under the Solar Heating and
Cooling Demonstration Act of 1970. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2473, 5501-17 (Supp. IV, 1974). For an
excellent discussion of these issues, see Commoner, Energy, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 2, 1976,
at 38; id., Feb. 9, 1976, at 38; id., Feb. 16, 1976, at 64.
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Rhode Island. The plans called for the storage of gas in two
Staten Island tanks and envisioned that the gas would be supplied
to the Public Service Company of New Jersey by pipeline and to two
major New York utilities, the Brooklyn Union Gas Company and
Consolidated Edison, by both pipeline and barge. Distrigas has al-
ready built two storage tanks on Staten Island.
It would have been difficult to choose a location which would pose
a greater threat to human life. Over 300,000 people live on Staten
Island and another 600,000 in nearby areas of New Jersey. Only
slightly farther away are Brooklyn's 2,800,000 people. The site lies
between two small airports, Staten Island's Miller Field (6.5 miles
away) and Linden, New Jersey (4 miles away). Moreover, numerous
flights bound to or from Kennedy, La Guardia, and Newark airports
traverse Staten Island daily, and 220,000 vessels per year pass this
site while crossing New York Harbor, the busiest harbor in the
United States. More than 11,500 vessels annually pass this site
while traveling along the Arthur Kill, separating Staten Island from
New Jersey."
The Distrigas plan envisages 70 tanker deliveries per year. Origi-
nally, it also proposed 138 barge shipments to Brooklyn Union and
Con Edision. These barges would have traveled directly across the
main shipping lanes of New York Harbor and under three heavily-
trafficked bridges. Since the Coast Guard requires that all major
harbor traffic be halted in the channel used by an LNG tanker, this
would mean effectively closing down the Port of New York to large
ships as frequently as one day out of every five days. The port
presently averages five serious collisions per year involving ships of
over 1,000 tons displacement.49 Under the Distrigas plan, tankers of
36-foot draft must traverse the Arthur Kill which is scarcely deeper.
Fortunately, the ill-conceived plan to barge LNG has been cancelled
by its proponents due to Distrigas' financial difficulties and in light
of strong opposition by the State of New York and by environmental
and civic groups.
The siting of LNG storage tanks in areas remote from cities is
48. IMPACT STATEMENT, vol. 1, at 2-14 (1974).
49. Id. at 3-34.
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absolutely vital in order to reduce the perils of fire and marine
collision. Savannah, Georgia provides a striking contrast to New
York in this regard. Its LNG terminal is several miles downriver
from the city, in a virtually unpopulated area. While a comparable
site near New York City would be difficult, if not impossible, to find,
LNG terminals need not be located in urban areas since gas can
easily be transported by pipeline over long distance at minimal risk.
Thus there is little reason to expose hundreds of thousands of people
and hundreds of ships to LNG's hazards when more remote sites are
available. The additional costs are a sound and relatively small
investment in public safety.
Although those who resist more stringent tanker safety controls
shrug off the risks of collision or fire as unlikely, there have been
over 550 tanker collisions in the United States in the decade 1960-
70; four-fifths of the collisions involved ships entering or leaving
port 0 Furthermore, control over tanker traffic in oil and LNG re-
mains inadequate in several respects.
III. Methods of Long Distance Transportation of LNG
A. Historical Perspective
Until an economic means of transporting gas over long distances
was developed, natural gas which could not be used locally was
usually flared off at the wellhead. Although pipelines provided an
inexpensive means of shipping natural gas overland, there was no
practical way to transport gas produced in the Middle East to Amer-
ican and European markets until cryogenic technology was able to
develop the LNG tanker, a craft capable of transporting large
quantities of gas in liquefied form. Since LNG can be shipped in
1/630 the space needed for gas in vaporized form, its transportation
by tanker makes economic sense-provided it can be done safely.
Ironically, in view of subsequent events, the transportation of
LNG by tanker commenced in 1959 when a cargo was exported from
Louisiana to England."' The United States Coast Guard and the
American Bureau of Shipping, a private trade group, have adopted
standards for LNG tankers and the handling of their cargoes, but
50. R. NIXON, Special Message to the Congress on Marine Pollution from Oil Spills in PUB.
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, RICHARD NIXON 1970, at 443 (1971).
51. SPECIAL HAZARDS BULL. 43.
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the sufficiency of these standards and the adequacy of inspection of
these ships are open to question.
LNG tankers are double-hulled. Some LNG tanks on ships are
double-strength, with air space between the outer and inner bulk-
heads. Other tanks are directly attached to the inner hull; or in
some cases, independent of the ship's structure but supported by it.
The cargo is frequently used as fuel for the tanker itself.5"
Among the ever-present dangers inherent in tanker operations are
marine collisions, where sparks from friction could ignite the cargo
or cause damage to the tanks from the motion and vibration of the
ship. Escaping LNG could fracture the ship's deck. In addition,
overpressurization of LNG could cause the tank to crack or even
rupture. Two other serious dangers are fire at sea and the failure of
the ship's cryogenic temperature system.
B. Tanker Safety and Harbor Safety
Because of the lack of effective international safeguards for ship
construction and crew training, tankers, like all ocean vessels, are
only as safe as the laws of their country of registry require. "Flags
of convenience" have led to much of the world's oil tonnage being
carried on Liberian and Panamanian vessels-a pattern which LNG
tankers continue to follow. In 1970 one-quarter of the entire world's
tanker tonnage and an even greater proportion of tankers under
construction53 were of Liberian registry.
Both the Torrey Canyon, which ran aground in the English Chan-
nel in 1967 with a loss of enormous quantities of oil, 4 and the Arrow,
which caused a similar oil spill in Canadian waters,55 were of Lib-
erian registry."6 After the Arrow spill a Canadian government com-
mission reported:"
52. For a discussion of the characteristics of LNG tankers, see COMPTROLLER GENERAL REP.
24-25. For a more rigorous analysis of the specifications of LNG tankers, see Soesan & Ffooks,
LNG Carriers-the New Liners, in OUTLOOK FOR NATURAL GAs-A QUALITY FUEL 99 (P. Hep-
ple ed. 1973).
53. Hunter, Possibilities and Problems of Preventing Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 4
TRANSP. L.J. 21, 46-47 (1972).
54. Id. at 33 n.45.
55. Compare id. at 29 with id. at 48 n.155.
56. Id. at 48 & n.155.
57. Id. at 48.
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We are well aware of the fact that no form of transportation can be 100
percent safe but from the record available to us the standard of operation of
the world's tanker fleets, particularly those under flags of convenience, is so
appalling and so far from the kind of safety which science, engineering and
technology can bring to those who care, that the people of the world should
demand immediate action.
Of course, nothing of the sort has occurred. There is still no effec-
tive international body of law to regulate the construction of tank-
ers, their maintenance, their routes, or the competence of their offi-
cers and crews. The recent Caracas and Geneva conferences of the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)
have produced some well-reasoned ideas, but as far as effective
international agreement is concerned in this area, we are still in the
pre-League of Nations era.
The IMCO conferences did result in approved routes in a few
heavily-trafficked sea lanes such as the English Channel where the
Torrey Canyon disaster had highlighted the need for traffic lanes to
even the most stubbornly resistant "Lord Jims" of the world. But
these lanes are only "suggested," not mandatory, as are their coun-
terparts on land and in the air.5" The time-honored right of the
master of a ship to choose his own course has not yet been restricted
by any enforcible international law. Yet seven percent of the world's
fleet-one out of every fourteen ships-is involved in a collision
every year. Moreover, these collisions most often occur, as one might
expect, in crowded water-fully half of them between the English
Channel and the Elbe, for example.5"
"Human error" has been repeatedly singled out as the principal
cause of tanker accidents.'" Yet IMCO, for lack of an international
consensus, has failed to mandate the use of navigational aids even
when those aids are available. And the world's tankers still largely
fly flags of convenience, despite the unenforced rule of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea that "[tlhere must exist
a genuine link between the State [of registry] and the ship" such
as "jurisdiction and control" effectively exercised.'
In the utter absence of meaningful international controls, the
58. Id. at 35.
59. Id. at 34 n.50.
60. Id. at 36.
61. Id. at 46.
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United States and some other coastal countries have begun to en-
force their own standards. For example, the 1971 Vessel Bridge-to-
Bridge Radiotelephone Act"2 requires vessels in American waters to
have a radiotelephone on their bridge.
Tanker construction in the United States is regulated by the Ports
and Waterways Safety Act,63 which amended the earlier Tanker
Vessel Act 4 and now requires environmental safety to be considered
in the design of tankers of United States registry. Tankers of foreign
registry carrying hazardous cargoes must possess a Coast Guard
letter of compliance with American standards in order to enter
United States waterways. The Coast Guard's regulations65 under
this act require new tankers carrying liquefied flammable gases to
meet safety standards with regard to container design and construc-
tion and to be periodically inspected. Foreign vessels are only sub-
ject to inspection the first time they enter United States waters, and
not afterwards. Although some LNG tankers are of French registry
and therefore subject to strict safety standards in construction and
inspection, many fly flags of convenience, such as Liberia's, which
provide less occasion for confidence.
Tanker traffic in ports is regulated by the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act 6 which authorizes the Secretary of Transportation
to establish traffic controls in harbors and other congested water-
ways and enact procedures for the handling of dangerous cargoes.
Pursuant to this mandate, the Coast Guard has begun to modernize
its regulations, but safety requirements have not fully adapted to
new conditions.
Except in emergency situations, Coast Guard regulations require
the master of a ship carrying dangerous cargo to furnish 24 hours'
notice to the Captain of the Port before entering a harbor and to
provide specific information as to the flammable cargo." In addi-
tion, the regulations impose requirements on the transfer of hazard-
ous cargoes. 8 But present Coast Guard policy and regulations are
62. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1201-08 (Supp. IV, 1974). Coast Guard Regulations implementing this
act are in 33 C.F.R. §§ 26.01-.10 (1975).
63. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-27 (Supp. IV, 1974).
64. 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. IV, 1974).
65. 46 C.F.R. §§ 38.01-1 to .25-10 (1975).
66. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-27 (Supp. IV, 1974).
67. 33 C.F.R. §§ 124.10, .14 (1975).
68. Id. §§ 126.01 -.37.
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nevertheless inadequate to deal with frequent shipments of LNG in
a harbor as congested as that of New York. The broad discretion of
the Coast Guard's Captain of the Port is intended to provide an
adequate safeguard. This, however, is no substitute for thorough
inspection of tankers before they enter harbors or for effective legis-
lation placing storage tanks and transfer operations far from
densely-populated urban areas.
Under current Coast Guard policy each LNG tanker must notify
the Captain of the Port 72 hours before docking, and must stand
offshore for boarding and inspection on its first voyage." This
inspection is unlikely to reveal flaws in tank bulkheads, pipes, or
cooling systems which may prove disastrous. Recently, the failure
to require inspection after the first arrival of a vessel resulted in the
entry of an LNG tanker into Boston's harbor with a leak known to
its captain but not to the Coast Guard.'" Despite the skill and dedi-
cation of the personnel of the Coast Guard, there is no substitute
for more effective legislative regulation of port traffic.
IV. Regulating the Storage of LNG
Onshore regulatory jurisdiction is fragmented. For example, in
New York, the Public Service Commission (PSC) must approve the
construction of gas storage tanks,7 but it lacks jurisdiction over the
unloading of LNG tankers and the interstate transmission of LNG.
At first, after the PSC approved the construction of Staten Island
storage tanks, the FPC disclaimed jurisdiction over Distrigas' appli-
cation." One year later, however, the FPC reversed itself and held
that certification was required since it was empowered to regulate
imports. In affirming the FPC's determination, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held that the FPC could regulate ter-
minals receiving LNG from a foreign country and any sales there-
from although such importation did not constitute foreign com-
merce.
73
69. U.S. COAST GUARD, GENERAL AND SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR LNG/LPG OPERATIONS
in IMPACT STATEMENT, vol. 2, app. C, at 2.
70. For a discussion of this incident, see Ingram, Peril of the Month: Gas Supertankers,
WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Feb., 1973, at 7, 11-12.
71. Compare N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 68 (McKinney 1955) with id. § 2(10). The PSC also
regulates transmission lines. Id. §§ 120-30 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
72. Distrigas Corp. v. FPC, 495 F. 2d 1057, 1058-62 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
834 (1974).
73. Id. But see Border Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 171 F.2d 149 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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The National Environmental Policy Act of 196911 requires every
federal agency, before taking or licensing any action which might
substantially affect the environment, to consider th environmental
consequences of its decision,7" and to prepare an impact statement
analyzing the risks involved. The FPC's final environmental impact
statement on the Distrigas LNG proceeding was prepared in July
of 1974, while its hearings were still taking place. But this statement
glosses over the risks which have been examined here, and fails to
deal as thoroughly as it should with alternatives such as remote
siting and the use of pipelines rather than barges. Fortunately,
Distrigas' plans to transport LNG by barge have terminated as a
result of its financial difficulties. But the dangerous location of the
tanks themselves, and the hazards of traversing New York Harbor
and the narrow Arthur Kill with LNG tankers are still present. It
remains to be seen whether the FPC will give those dangers the
respect they deserve.
V. Legal Liability and Insurance in Marine LNG Disasters
Fortunately, there have not been any marine accidents involving
LNG tankers. This is probably due to the novelty of such shipments.
If, as we must assume, the ordinary rules of maritime and other tort
liability apply, LNG's unusual hazards present some difficult prob-
lems. An uncontrolled fire caused by LNG would be likely to wreak
extraordinary damage over such a wide area that fire insurance
claims would be astronomical. Following any LNG accident, even
if contained, premiums would probably climb steeply throughout
the surrounding area.
Questions of liability might be difficult to unravel where a holo-
caust destroys evidence as to whether the accident was caused by a
tanker, barge operator, or storage-tank owner. In addition there is
the problem of adequate insurance coverage. At present no insur-
ance is required, and one guess as to what constitutes adequate
coverage is as good as another.
LNG accidents also lie at the border between admiralty and ordi-
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-47 (Supp. 1976). New
York adopted parallel legislation in 1975. N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW §§ 8-0101
to -0115 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), as amended 43-32 (1970), as amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332
(Supp. 1976).
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nary tort law. When admiralty concepts apply, some of them are
troublesome. For example, the Federal Limitation of Liability Act
of 185111 still limits a shipowner's liability to the value of the ship
and its cargo in cases where the damage occurred without his
knowledge. This is true whether the vessel is American or foreign.
Apparently, this obsolete statute was, the courts tell us, enacted to
encourage investment in shipping and shipbuilding, and it is to be
construed broadly."
Although federal policy with respect to penalties for oil spills has
grown stricter over the years,7" it has done little in preventing oil
spills, let alone marine accidents. Moreover, it is totally ineffective
in dealing with LNG, which does not spill as does oil, but vaporizes
with even more devastating consequences. Furthermore, these
laws do not alter the anachronistic statutes limiting the ship-
owner's liability.79
VI. Conclusion
Federal and state legislation is desperately needed. The New York
Senate has proposed legislation which would impose strict liability
in cases involving oil and gas spills, fires, and other accidents. 0 The
validity of such state laws was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.,, 1 on the basis that
federal admiralty jurisdiction and legislation had not preempted the
field. It is now clear that whatever obstacles to such legislation exist
in the statehouses of the coastal states, such obstacles are not fed-
eral constitutional ones.
76. 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1970).
77. See, e.g., Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 411 (1943). An owner of a ship includes one
who charters it. 46 U.S.C. § 186 (1970). See The Severance, 152 F.2d 916, 921 (4th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 328 U.S. 853 (1946).
78. For an historical development of federal policy in this area, see Note, Liability for Oil
Pollution Cleanup and Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 973
(1970).
79. In contrast, Canada's Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act, CAN. REV. STAT. C.2 (1st
Supp. 1970), imposes absolute liability for damage and cleanup costs for depositing waste in
Arctic waters and mandates financial security requirements and safety standards. This exem-
plary act is described in Kalsi, Oil in Neptune's Kingdom: Problems and Responses to
Contain Environmental Degradation of the Oceans by Oil Pollution, 3 ENVIRONMENTAL
AFFAIRs 79 (1974). See also Wood, An Integrated International and Domestic Approach to
Civil Liability for Vessel-Source Oil Pollution, 7 J. OF MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 1 (1975).
80. N.Y. Sen. 2833 (1975).
81. 411 U.S. 325, 343-44 (1973).
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In addition to legislation imposing strict liability for this
ultrahazardous activity and subjecting vessels and equipment to
vigorous state inspection and safety requirements, there is a need
for a mandatory liability insurance program, federally subsidized as
in the case of the Price-Anderson Act 2 covering nuclear reactors,
but without the anachronistic and much criticized ceiling on cover-
age contained therein." The need for such an insurance program is
heightened by the fact that many individual tankers are separate
corporations, so that the corporation's entire assets might easily be
consumed by one blaze.
Finally, there is a need for federal and state legislation with re-
spect to the siting of LNG storage tanks. After a comprehensive
examination of the entire subject, legislation should be passed set-
ting specific statutory criteria, such as distance from heavily-
populated areas and congested harbors. 4 Legislation has been intro-
duced as part of the New York State Attorney General's program
to authorize PSC regulation of the siting of LNG storage tanks and
terminals. This proposed legislation would require the PSC to con-
sider proximity to densely-populated areas, ship traffic lanes, and
transportation routes in approving sites."
The concerns voiced by New Yorkers over the Staten Island tanks
and the risks of LNG importation in the absence of effective regula-
tion underscore the need for vigilance to insure that regulatory agen-
cies meet their responsibility of protecting the public. Those who
gloss over the risks of marine collision and fire and oppose stricter
regulation of New York City's harbor traffic should consider the
disaster which struck another Atlantic seaport in 1917.86 On the
morning of December 6 of that year the Mont Blanc, a French
freighter laden with munitions, was struck by the Imo, a large
Belgian relief ship carrying wheat, in the entrance to Halifax har-
bor. Both ships were piloted by experienced pilots, and each plainly
saw the other approaching well before the collision. Yet the Imo,
heading outward, crossed mid-channel and cut across the path of
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970).
83. See id. § 2210(d).
84. CF. 10 C.F.R. §§ 100.1-11 (1975) (dealing with the distances which nuclear reactors
must be separated from population centers).
85. N.Y. Ass. 9916 (1976).
86. For an exhaustive discussion of this disaster, see M. BIRD, THE TOWN THAT DIED (1962).
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the Mont Blanc and the two collided. The smaller freighter burned
for twenty minutes until, inevitably, its cargo of lyddite and TNT
exploded, wrecking much of the city of Halifax and neighboring
Dartmouth, across the harbor. Between 1900 and 3200 persons died
in the explosion and ensuing fire; 9000 were injured and thousands
more left homeless. 7 The Halifax disaster proves beyond dispute
that human fallibility can cause the most frightening consequences
despite what appears to be a surfeit of precautions.
The only certain means of avoiding similar catastrophes would be
for explosives not to enter the harbor. Perhaps wartime exigencies
required the cargo to enter Halifax; but it is difficult to justify
running the risk of the holocaust an LNG accident might cause
when there are alternatives, such as remote siting of storage tanks
and pipeline transportation of gas to cities.
The public has been subjected to much discussion of the economic
need to import LNG, but the economic catastrophies and the enor-
mous dislocations which would result from a serious fire in New
York and other major harbors deserve equal consideration. Too
many in the nineteenth-century shrugged off all too readily the risks
imposed on the lungs of coal miners and the limbs of railroad brake-
men until safety measures were belatedly required by government.
No thinking person today wants to repeat those lessons. Nor should
we wager the lives of thousands of port and maritime employees and
residents of urban areas, such as Staten Island as long as available
alternatives and safeguards exist. We must strike a balance between
valid energy and maximum safety, and a government which fails to
strike the balance is remiss.
87. Id. at 186.
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